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NOTE
RECONSIDERING THE USE OF FORCED POOLING
FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT
Lindsey Trachtenberg*
Hydrocarbonscan be producedmore efficiently ihen neighboring
landowners work in cooperation, rather than in competition. Yet market
failures often make it difficult for landovners and the well operators iwith
wihom they contract to reach agreementsfor the cooperative development
of hy drocarbon reservoirs. Therefore, some states have enactedforced
poolingprovisions, vhich allow states to compel cooperativedevelopment
under certain criteria. While forced pooling is generally acceptablefor
traditionaloil andgas resources, state legislatures and regulators should
reassess theirforced poolingprovisions as they are applied to shale gas
resources. Based on the unique characteristicsof shale gas, including
the modern technologies used to produce it and strong environmental
opposition to its development,forced pooling may not be appropriatefor
shale gas development. Ifstates maintainforced pooling for shale gas
resources, they should consider altering the procedures that are used to
compel pooling.

*Yale Law School, J.D.. 2012; Cornell University, A.B., 2006. 1would like to
thank Professor Carol Rose for her thoughtful and supportive feedback, the planners and participants of University at Buffalo Law School's hydrofracking conference for sharing their insights, and the editorial team of the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Producing natural gas from shale is a controversial practice.
Some residents of states with shale gas reserves favor development
of the resource for economic reasons.' Others oppose development
due to environmental concerns. Wherever shale gas production
proceeds,3 states will be called upon to define and enforce property
rights dictating who controls where and when shale gas production
occurs and who bears the costs and benefits of that production.
The three primary styles of assigning property rights for
oil and gas are the rule of capture, forced pooling, and forced
unitization. The rule of capture is the traditional system for
allocating ownership of oil and natural gas and dictates that those
resources are owned by the person who has brought them under his
control.' The rule of capture generally leads to competition among
neighboring landowners and leaseholders as they seek to quickly
extract resources from the common pool of oil or gas that underlies
their property. Rapid uncoordinated removal of oil and gas leads to
overinvestment in wells and the creation of pockets of oil or gas that
are not economically feasible to produce.5 While these problems
'E.g., Paul D. Addis, We Need a AMarcellus Plan: The Next Governor AMust Maximize Benefits for Pennsylvania, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2010), http://
www.post-gazette.com/pg/10299/1097986-109.stm ("The Marcellus Shale offers
Pennsylvania a path to prosperity."').
2

Eg., Mireya Navarro, Proposed Gas Drilling Upstate Raises Concerns About
Water Supply, N.Y. TIMts (Dec. 18, 2008), http://xwww.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/
nyregion/19drill.html.
Shale gas production may not proceed everywhere that it is economically feasible. For instance, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation
has proposed prohibiting high-volume hydrofracturing in the New York City and
Syracuse watersheds. N.Y. STAYE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FEVISED DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL GENEiC ENVIRONMA4ENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND
SOLUTION MINiNG RLGULATORY PROGRAM 7-55-56 (Sept. 2011).

'E g., Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18A. 724, 725 (Pa.
1889) (describing the system for securing ownership of natural gas in Pennsylvania as of 1889).
E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 319 (1943) ("The practice of attempting to drain oil from under the surface holdings of others leads to offset
wells and other wasteful practices."); Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The
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can be addressed by regulations or voluntary agreements between
neighbors, competitive development of a common resource remains
a primary characteristic of oil and gas development under the rule
of capture.
Forced pooling and forced unitization both seek to address
the negative consequences of competition by allowing governments
to compel cooperation among neighboring landowners and oil or gas
leaseholders. Forced pooling, sometimes referred to as compulsory
integration, allows states to compel landowners whose land in
aggregate is of sufficient size to support one well or a group of wells,
to develop their resources in cooperation with one another so long
as some of the landowners wish to develop the resource. Forced
unitization, which will not be discussed further in this article, is
analogous to forced pooling, except that it brings an entire reservoir
into cooperative development.
The controversy surrounding forced pooling as applied
to shale gas development is complex. Forced pooling finds both
popular opposition 6 and support from property rights advocates
Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements, 15 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 526, 527-28 (1999) ("As firms compete for migratory oil and gas
they dissipate reservoir rents with excessive capital, too rapid production, and lost
total recovery." (citation omitted)) [hereinafter Libecap & Smith, Self-Enforcing
Provisions].
6 For an example of property rights and environmental arguments opposing
forced pooling, see Laura Legere, "ForcedPooling" Legislation for Gas Industry Planned in Pennsylvania, Tim TJMES-TRIBLTNE (Scranton, Pa.) (July 11, 2010),

http: /thetimes-tribune. com news/for ced-pooling-le gislation-for-gas- industry planned-in-pennsylvania- 1.88534 1#axzz I 8DhTHqQ7 ("Opponents of forced
pooling ... call it a kind of eminent domain, 'but instead of using private property
for the public good, it takes private property for private gain.' 'They talk about it
in terms of conservation, but what they are talking about is conserving the gas,
not the land or the environment,' said Myron Arnowitt, the Pennsylvania director
of Clean Water Action and the lead signatory on the letter.").
For an example of property rights and environmental arguments supporting
forced pooling, see Elizabeth Skrapits, Forced Pooling Still an Issue in Pennsylvania, DAILY REVILXw (Towanda, Pa.) (Oct. 12, 2010), http://thedailyreview.com/
new s/forced-pooling-still-an-issue-in-pennsylvania- 1.1047461 ("Fair pooling
'dramatically reduces above-ground disturbance' and allow s gas to be collected
in an orderly manner, Marcellus Shale Coalition spokesman Travis Windle said.
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and environmentalists. Property rights advocates who are deeply
protective of individual property rights view forced pooling as an
unfair, or unwise, governmental intrusion into property owners'
right to exclude activity from their land. However, forced pooling
finds support among property advocates who are concerned with
efficient development of resources and property owners' correlative
rights. Likewise, environmentalists are divided in their view on
forced pooling. Some environrentalists regard forced pooling as
the triumph of the gas industry over the environmental concerns
of citizens and, therefore, oppose it. Yet other environmentalists
view forced pooling as a means of promoting efficient land use for
gas production and support the use of forced pooling where gas
production proceeds.
To aid in understanding the special implications for forced
pooling with respect to shale gas development, this paper will focus
on the development of natural gas from the Marcellus Shale. The
Marcellus Shale extends through a large swath of the mid-Atlantic
and underlies significant portions of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and West Virginia.' New York 9 and Ohio' 0 have forced pooling
provisions. Pennsylvania has a forced pooling provision, but that
provision does not apply to resources developed from the Marcellus
Shale." West Virginia does not have any forced pooling provision.
While prior scholarly attention has been given to forced
pooling with respect to traditional oil and gas production, little
academic focus has been given to how the unique characteristics
of shale gas and the techniques used to produce it affect the use

'Ifs an absolute environmental winner.

. . .

he said. Windle said fair pooling is

good for landowners - 'Everyone's compensated for production, whether they
have a lease or not, under a pooling statute' - and for consumers, who would
benefit from more supply in the market.").
IDANIEL J. SOEDER & WILLIAM M. KAPPEL, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION FROM THE MARCELLUS SHALE I (May 2009),
available at http://md.water.usgs.gov publications/fs-2009-3032/fs-2009-3032.

pdf.
9N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 23-0901 (McKinney
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West 2010).

"58 PA. STT. ANN. §408 (West 2010).

2010).
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of forced pooling.' 2 This paper argues that, while forced pooling
generally makes sense for oil and gas development, the assumptions
that underlie the traditional analysis of forced pooling should be
reexamined for its application to shale gas development utilizing
hydraulic fracturing ("hydrofracturing") and horizontal drilling.
This paper proceeds in six parts. Part I reviews the basic
underpinnings of shale gas development and its environmental
repercussions. Part II seeks to understand the basic property regimes
that apply to the development of natural gas. Part III explores how
cooperation among neighbors leads to the efficient development of
gas resources and why completely voluntary agreements between
neighbors often fail. Part IV examines how forced pooling is used
in practice to compensate for those failures. Part V then considers
the implications of forced pooling provisions on affected parties
and the environment. Finally, Part VI analyzes how modern shale
gas development differs from traditional natural gas production and
how those unique characteristics should impact states' construction
of forced pooling systems.
I.

BACKGROUND ON SHALE GAS PRODUCTION

A. Shale Gas and the Technology Used to Produce It
Shale gas (i.e., natural gas produced from hydrocarbon-rich
shale formations) is in its infancy as an economically viable natural
resource. The recent increase in shale gas production has two roots.
First, rising natural gas prices have made the development of shale
gas more lucrative. 13 Second, technological advances in natural gas
production methods, namely horizontal drilling and hydrofracturing,
have decreased the cost of producing shale gas." While horizontal
12 For

recent article addressing the application of Texas's forced pooling statute to
shale gas production, see Ronnie Blackwell, Forced Pooling Within the Barnett
Shale: How Should the Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act Apply to Units with
Horizontal Wells?, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1 (2010).
" NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB.,

U.S.

OPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
PRIMER].

14Id

DEPT OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVEL-

A PRMER 9 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter

SHALE

C AS
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drilling and hydrofracturing are independent technologies, they are
often used together for producing shale gas.
Well operators use horizontal drilling to access land distant
from the wellhead. To drill a horizontal well, a well operator first
drills to depth and then manipulates the drilling direction towards
horizontal. Doing so exposes more rock volume per wellbore than
a traditional vertical well. "For example, in the Marcellus Shale in
Pennsylvania, a vertical well may be exposed to as little as fifty ft
of formation while a horizontal well may have a lateral wellbore
extending in length from 2,000 to 6000 ft within the 50- to 300-ft
thick formation."1 The additional exposure allows well operators
to capture more gas per well drilled, making shale gas production
economically practicable.
Hydrofracturing is a method of stimulating a hydrocarbon
reserve that is used to overcome the naturally low permeability of

shale, which poses a barrier to collecting shale gas.' 6 To hydraulically
fracture a reservoir, the well operator pumps fluids and sand into
a wellbore. Chemical additives, such as friction reducers and
biocides, also are pumped into the well." The fluids fracture the
surrounding rock and the sand props open those synthetic fractures.
The fractures increase the permeability of the rock, which allows
trapped hydrocarbons to migrate toward the wellbore.'
B. Environmental Impacts of Shale Gas Production
While all oil and gas production poses environmental risks,
environmental opposition to shale gas production is particularly
strong. Shale gas production poses two sets of environmental risks
- those that are common to all gas development and those that are
unique to shale gas development. As shale gas becomes economically
viable to produce, well operators are looking to establish shale gas
wells in locations where landowners did not previously consider the
possibility of such an industrial use of their land. Along with the

,Id. at 47 (internal citation omitted).
16Id at 56.
" Id at 61.

"8 Id at 56.
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potential economic windfall of producing shale gas from their land,
the landowners must contend with the environmental problems that
are attendant to any natural gas production. These problems include
groundwater pollution from drilling and operating the well,19
surface disturbance (including forest fragmentation, wildlife habitat
destruction, and erosion)," surface water pollution due to runoff
from eroded areas, 2' ai pollution from gas escaping wells and
running equipment for operating the wells, and negative aesthetic
impacts.
Environmental risks that are unique to shale gas production
are primarily due to hydrofracturing. While strict regulations may
effectively manage some of these risks, state agencies are just
beginning to update their regulatory systems to account for the
special characteristics of shale gas development. Many of these
particular environmental risks are focused on water resources. One
concern is whether hydrofracturing will deplete water reservoirs. To
hydrofracture a well, well operators pump large quantities of water
into the well.> The water volume used for fracturing wells "is small
in terms of the overall surface water budget for an area; however,
operators need this water when drilling activity is occurring, requiring
19N.Y. STATE DEPIT OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMLNT ON TIM OIL, G AS AND SOLUTION MINING RLGULATORY
PROGRAM 6-34 (Sept. 2009) (revised Sept. 2011).
20 SHALE G As PRIMER, supra note 13, at 43 ("One consideration associated with
traditional gas development has been the surface disturbance required for access
roads and well pads.").
21
E.g., BUREAU OF OIL AND GAS MGMT., PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., Doc. No. 5500300-00 1, OIL AND GAS OPERATORS MANUAL, OIL AND GAS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, ch. 4 at 12 (2001).
2 See N.Y. STATE DEPT OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, ASSESSING AND MITIGATING VISUAL
IMTACTs 2 (2000) (requiring evaluation of "adverse visual and aesthetic impacts"
as part of permitting process for wells in a viewshed of a "designated aesthetic
resource" ).
23 See

e.g., Oil and Gas Wells, 40 Pa. Bull. 3845 (July 10, 2010) (to be codified
at 25 PA. CODE Ch. 78) (proposing updated rules for the casing and cementing of
wells).
24

SHALE G As PRIMER, supra note 13, at 64 (explaining that nearly four million gallons of water are needed to diill and fracture one well in the Marcellus shale, most

of wxhich is needed for fracturing).
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that the water be procured over a relatively short period of time."2 5
If the water is withdrawn while stream flow is low, it "could affect
fish and other aquatic life, fishing and other recreational activities,
municipal water supplies, and other industries such as power
plants." 6 Hauling large quantities of fluids for hydrofracturing may
also negatively impact infrastructure such as roads.
In addition to water diminution concerns, environmental
advocates worry that hydrofracturing may pollute water resources.
Some observers posit that hydrofracturing itself creates only a
small risk of groundwater pollution 28 others are more concerned. 9
In addition to threatening groundwater quality, hydrofracturing
generates risks for surface water quality. Some water that is used
to fracture a well returns to the surface. This produced water,
which contains additives used in fracturing and dissolved solids
accumulated underground, is sometimes stored at the surface in pits
before it is treated or disposed of."o Such pits may leak or overflow
in heavy precipitation.
Due to the uncertainty regarding the actual risks posed by
hydrofracturing to water quality and human health, the United States
2

Id. at 65.
1d.

26

27

W. VA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., INDUSTRY GUIDANCE: GAS WELL DRILLING /COM-

PLETION: LARGE WATER VOLUME FRACTURE TREATNENTs

3 (Jan. 8, 2010)

("Hauling

large volumes of water [for hydraulic fracturing] will result in significantly increased truck traffic that may create safety concerns, road damage, dust problems

and other environmental issues.").
28
E.g., Memorandum from the Congressional Research Service to Rep. Eric J. J.
Massa, Natural Gas Drilling in the Marcellus Shale 18 (Sept. 9, 2009) ("There are
concerns [that hydraulic fracturing] would create or extend fractures that would
link the Marcellus shale to an overlying aquifer. This may represent a remote possibility . . . .").
2

9E)g., HAZEN & SAWYER, FINAL IMPACT ASSESSNENT REPORT: IMIPACT ASSESSNENT
OF NAT@U
GAS PRODUCTION IN THE NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY WATERSHED

at ES-3

(Dec. 2009), available at http://xwww.ny c.gov/html/dep/html/press

releases/09-15pr.shtml (then follow the hyperlink for "Final Impact Assessment
Report (PDF)) ("[E]xtensive hydraulic fracturing of horizontal wells will present
subsurface contamination risks . . . .").
" SHALE GAs PRIMER, supra note 13, at 66-70; see, e.g., 25 PA. CODE §78.57(a)
(20 10).
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Environmental Protection Agency is conducting a multi-year study
on the "the possible relationships between hydraulic fracturing
and drinking water." Similarly, former Governor David Paterson
of New York ordered the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation to "analyze comprehensively the environmental
impacts associated with high-volume hydraulic fracturing combined
with horizontal drilling."32
In contrast to hydrofracturing, horizontal drilling offers
several potential environmental benefits. 3 First, the additional
volume of hydrocarbon-rich rock exposed by each horizontal well
means that fewer wells need to be drilled. Second, several horizontal
wells can be drilled from a single surface well pad. 4 The need
for fewer wells and well pads reduces the surface impacts of gas
production. Third, horizontal drilling can be used "to access natural
gas resources in instances not possible using a vertical well due to
existing infrastructure, buildings, environmentally sensitive areas,
or other surface conflicts."> Therefore, these special surface areas
can be left undisturbed even as the natural gas that underlies them
is collected.
Lastly, the effect of increased production of natural gas
on anthropogenic climate change is subject to debate. Natural gas
typically is viewed as a relatively low-carbon fossil fuel that can
replace dirtier fuels. 6 Increased production of natural gas could
provide a substitute for other fossil fuels and decrease the cost of
natural gas, making it a more attractive alternative to other fossil
EPA, HydraulicFracturing,NALRAL GAS EXTRACTION, http:/xwww.epa.gov/hydraulicfracture/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
2
3 N.Y. ExEC. ORDER No. 41 (2010).
3 SHALE GAS PRMER, supra note 13, at 76 ("The use of horizontal drilling has not
introduced new environmental concerns.").
341d. at 47-48.
3 J. DANIEL ARTHLTR ET AL., ALL CONSUTLTPNG, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERMfIONS FOR NALTRAL GAs WELLS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE (presented at The
Groundwater Protection Council, 2008 Annual Forum, Cincinnati, Ohio, Sept.
24-28, 2008), available at www.thefriendsvillegroup.com/HydraulicFracturingReportl.2008.pdf.
6
Se, e.g., Pew Center PruvidesAgenda fur Climate Actiun, 16 Nu. 5 AIR PuLLU3

TowNCONSLLTANT

1.11-12 (2006).
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fuels. However, significant amounts of methane, a greenhouse gas,
may be vented during shale gas production, giving shale gas a larger
lifecycle environmental footprint than conventional gas or oil
II. BASIC PROPERTY RULES

FOR HYDROCARBON PRODUCTION

In order to fully comprehend the effects and implications
of forced pooling, one must understand the basic property rules
that are modified by forced pooling. These rules dictate what a
property owner can and cannot control regarding oil and natural gas
development on his and neighboring property.
A. Physical Property Boundaries
A surface landowner's rights do not always extend to the
subsurface of his parcel. For real property owned in fee simple, the
same party owns both the surface rights and the underlying mineral
rights.3 However, subsurface mineral rights can be severed from
the surface estate. If the mineral rights are severed from the surface
rights, the surface owner may have only a limited right to exclude the
mineral owner from the surface property. For example, Pennsylvania
recognizes the mineral owner's right to reasonable use of overlying
surface property in order to access his minerals, although the surface
owner can demand payment from the mineral owner for damage to
crops, timber, or the surface owner's water supply.3 9 Likewise, Ohio
considers the surface rights to be subservient to the mineral rights
by default.40 In this respect, Pennsylvania and Ohio favor the right
Robert W Howarth et al., Letter: AMethane and the Greenhouse-GasFootprint
o Natural Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLMATIC CHANGE 679 (2011), avail-

able at http://",.,"www.sustainablefuture.cornell.edu/news/attachments/HowarthEtAl-2011 .pdf.
Cq John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REv. 979
(2008) (challenging the traditional view that landowners own the sub-surface of
their land to the center of the earth).
39PA. DEPT OF ENVTL. PROT., Doc. No. 5500-FS-DEP2834, LANDOWNERS AND OIL
AND GAs LEASES IN PENNSYLVANIA, (2010), available at http://xwww.elibrary.dep.
state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-8 1979/5500-FS-DEP2834.pdf.
40 Ohio Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, FrequentlyAsked Questions about Oil and
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of a mineral owner to develop the mineral resource over the right of
a surface owner to exclude others from his property.
With respect to gas drilling, physical property rights
must be considered horizontally as well as vertically. The use of
hydrofracturing has cast uncertainty on what may permissibly cross
subsurface property boundaries and what constitutes a subsurface
trespass (i.e., the illegal crossing of property lines as they extend
underground). Drilling a non-vertical wellbore that extends into a
neighbor's subsurface property has long been considered a form of
trespass." However, states have yet to articulate whether they will
consider trans-boundary hydrofractures to be trespassory. This issue
came before the Texas Supreme Court in CoastalOil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust.4 The court held that a neighbor's claim for any
injury resulting from a trans-boundary hydrofracture was precluded
by the rule of capture regardless ofwhether trans-boundary fractures
are considered a trespass. The court declined to reach a decision on
whether trans-boundary hydraulic fractures amounted to trespass.44
The concurring opinion in GarzaEnergy Trust, authored by
Judge Willett, expressed a policy concern that domestic fossil fuel
resources are becoming increasingly costly and difficult to develop
and that "[g]iven this supply-side slide, maximizing recovery via
hydraulic fracturing is essential: enshrining trespass liability for
hydraulic fracturing . . . isnot."4 At first glance, it seems that trespass
liability for hydrofractures should not impact gas supply because
well operators could theoreticallv buy easements for hydrofractures
from neighboring landowners to avoid trespass liability. However,
two problems may arise for a well operator looking to buy easements
for hydraulic fractures. First, neighbors may be unwilling to sell the
Gas Leasing and Drilling in Ohio, DIVISION OF Mm. RESOURCES MGTN. (2009),
http://xwww.dnr.state.oh.us/mineral/faqlandowner/tabid/17871/default.aspx (last
visited Apr. 12, 2012).
41
See, e.g., Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. 1950).
42
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I (Tex. 2008).
4 Id. at 12-13; see also FPL Farming Ltd. v.Envtl. Processing Systems, L.C., 351
S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (describing GarzaEnergy Trustas holding "that the
rule of capture precluded damages for drainage by fracturing").
44
Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W3d at 12.
4Id. at 29 (Willett, J., concurring).
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easements to the well operator for any reasonable price. The problem
of landowners refusing to voluntarily sell property rights for oil and
gas development is a major concern addressed by forced pooling.
Second, well operators may not know where to purchase
fracture easements. The ability of well operators to produce
fractures of a desired length is unclear. Well operating companies
claim that they have significant control over hydraulic fractures.6
However, according to British Columbia's Oil and Gas Commission,
"[fracture propagation via large scale hydraulic fracturing operations
has proven difficult to predict. Existing planes of weakness in target
formations may result in fracture lengths that exceed initial design
expectations." 4 7 Whether well operators improve their ability to
control hydrofractures, in turn, depends in part on whether transboundary fractures are a form of trespass. If they constitute trespass,
then well operators have an incentive to improve their control over
fractures in order to limit their need to buy fracture easements and
reduce their exposure to trespass liability. That incentive disappears
if trans-boundary hydraulic fractures are not considered trespasses.
B. Rule of Capture
Conventional oil and gas are migratory resources, meaning
that they can freely cross property lines. In this sense, they have
been analogized to animals and percolating water and, based on this
analogy, courts have applied the rule of capture to oil and natural
gas." In 1889, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid out the basic
underpinnings of the ownership of oil and gas resources under the
rule of capture:

46

See, e.g., CHLSAPEAKE ENERGY, HYDRATLIC FRACTURING FACT SHIET (2011), available at http:/ xxwww.chk.com/media/educational-library/fact-sheets/corporate/hy draulic-fracturing fact sheet.pdf.
47 BC OIL & GAS CON&MN, SAFETY ADVISORY,

CoNIcATION DURING FRAC(2010), available at http://xwww.bcogc.ca/document.
aspxdocumentlD=808&type=.pdf.
48
Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule ofCapture -iAn Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 906 (2005).
TURE

STIMLATION
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They belong to the owner of the land, and are part
of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject
to his control; but when they escape, and go into
other land, or come under another's control, the title
of the former owner is gone. Possession of the land,
therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If
an adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills his own
land, and taps your gas, so that it comes into his well
and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his. 9
In essence, the Pennsylvania court conceptualized that a
landowner loses any claim to oil or gas once it comes under the
control of another. While that may be the case with a pure rule of
capture, such a pure rule has been modified by traditional common
law limitations. For example, courts have used the doctrine of
trespass to prohibit a well operator from capturing oil and gas from
his neighbor's property by drilling a wellbore into the neighbor's
property.5
Courts have also derived limits to the rule of capture from
the doctrine of correlative rights," the underlying principle of which
is that "landowners over a common reservoir have reciprocal rights
and duties" amongst themselves.5 For example, courts developed a
prohibition on generating an "unnatural" flow to capture gas under
the correlative rights doctrine. 3 A prohibition on inducing unnatural
49

Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa.
1889).
CE.g., Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. 1950) (holding
that such trespasses "are irreparable because they subtract from the very essence
of the estate"). Alternatively, wells that cross property boundaries may be conceptualized as violating the ad coelum rule.
'See, e.g., Kramer & Anderson, supra note 48, at 911-20.
2Theresa D. Poindexter, CorrelativeRights Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture,
Provides CorrectAnalvs isfor Resolving HydraulicFracturingCases [Coastal Oil
& Gas. Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I (Tex. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN
L.J. 755, 767 (2009).
5 See, e.g., Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57
N.E. 912, 916 (Ind. 1900). This focus on "natural" use finds analogous ideas in
traditional water rights regimes in the eastern United States. See Carol M. Rose,
Riparian Rights, in THE NEwx PLGJRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
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flow would be especially relevant to the production of shale gas
through hydrofracturing. The Texas Supreme Court, in GarzaEnergy
Trust, dealt with this issue by finding that hydrofracturing is not
more unnatural than drilling a well, which has long been accepted
as a means of inducing the flow of hydrocarbons.54
State legislatures and regulatory agencies have created
additional limits on the rule of capture by enacting regulations aimed
at reducing wasteful production of oil and gas. As landowners race to
develop common resources under the rule of capture, they overinvest
in drilling and use rapid uncoordinated extraction techniques that
leave some oil and gas buried deep underground. For example,
"ri]n 1914, the director of the Bureau of Mines estimated losses
hen the
from excessive drilling in the United States at $50 million, wx
value of U.S. production was $214 million."56 In other words, nearly
a quarter of the revenue gained from production was squandered.
Conservation regulations, such as well spacing requirements and
daily production limits, reduce excessive and wasteful production.
However, political barriers may prevent governments
from enacting the regulations necessary to optimize avoidance of
waste."8 For example, in the 1920s and 193Os, Oklahoma and Texas
enacted regulations specifying "the numbers of wells to be sunk,
well spacing, pooling, and production quotas." 5 9 These regulations
influenced the values of leases, so oil producers who stood to gain
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
4Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008).
"E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 319 (1943) ("The practice of attempting to drain oil from under the surface holdings of others leads to offset
wells and other wasteful practices."); Libecap & Smith, Self-Enforcing Provisions, supra note 5, at 527-28.
56Gary Libecap, What Really Happened at Teapot Dome?, in SECOND THOUGHTS.
MYTHS AND MORALS OF U.S. EcoNoMic HISTORY 158 (Donald N. McCloskey ed.,

1993).
S7 See,

e.g., James R.Neal, Compulsory PoolingPromotes Conservation ofAllichigan's Oil and Gas NaturalResources, 78 MICH. B.J. 158, 158-60 (1999).
* Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum
Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589, 594 (2002) [hereinafter Libecap & Smith, Economic Evolution].
59 Id.
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an advantage over their competition supported the regulations, while
producers who were likely to lose their advantage opposed them.60
The political compromises required to gain sufficient support to pass
any regulations resulted in the enactment of weakened regulations.6

III. COOPERATION AMONG NEIGHBORS
A. Maximizing Efficient Development of Common Reservoirs
Although sometimes difficult to obtain, cooperation between
landowners over a common reservoir maximizes efficiency in
developing the reservoir's resources. Gary Libecap and James Smith
explain that in recent periods of oil and gas development, cooperative
development by interested parties seeking to maximize efficient
development has eclipsed the rule of capture and conservation
regulations as the preferred solution to managing the common pool
problem inherent to oil and gas fields. Libecap and Smith applied
Harold Demsetz's theory "that the development of property rights
flows from underlying changes in the relative prices of goods and the
technologies that are used to produce them."6 3According to Libecap
and Smith, "[a]narchy prevailed initially" because, although aware
of inefficiencies, well operators lacked the requisite information
to coordinate a solution.64 That awareness "stimulated research
into the nature of reservoir mechanics and more efficient resource
recovery," which in turn provided the necessary information.65 Yet
the information alone was often insufficient to overcome significant
transaction costs to reaching private agreements.6 6 It was not until
the 1940s, when there were few new discoveries of oil and gas
reservoirs and reliance on secondary recovery techniques (i.e.,
the injection of fluids into partially depleted reservoirs to increase

60 d.

61Id
621d

at 591.

6 Id at 589.
641d

at 592.

6IT at 593.
6

1d
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subsurface pressure) became more prevalent,67 that cooperative
efforts also gained in popularity. According to Libecap and Smith,
the secondary recovery techniques, which required some wells to
be used as injection wells, rather than producing wells, prompted
neighbors to work in cooperation rather than competition.68
However, Libecap and Smith's reliance on Demsetz's theory
of the development of property rights is not the only way to explain
the rise of cooperative development. One might explain the same
phenomenon by applying Ferry Anderson and P.J. Hill's theory,
xxhich posits that changes in property rights are rooted in changes in
the marginal costs and benefits of defining and enforcing property
rights. 6 In this sense, the knowledge gained through scientific
research into reservoir dynamics and hydrocarbon production might
be seen as having reduced the marginal costs of defining rights
through private voluntary agreements. This reduction may have been
achieved by providing information to use in negotiations, thereby
reducing the transaction costs in reaching a private agreement to
define each partys rights. Furthermore, rather than assuming that
the technology of secondary recovery itself prompted new private
property practices, one could look at the underlying problem that led
to the popularity of secondary recovery, i.e., the increasing scarcity
of oil and gas. Escalating scarcity of a resource leads to an increased
marginal benefit in protecting one's stake in the resource, such that
landowners and well operators have more incentive to work with
neighbors so that they all obtain some profit, rather than risking the
loss of all of the oil or gas under their land to their neighbors under
the rule of capture.
Whichever explanation one follows, the end result is the
same: since the mid-1900s, landowners and well operators have
increasingly worked cooperatively rather than competitively to
efficiently extract hydrocarbons from a common reservoir.

67d. at

595.

61Id at 595-96.
69 Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution ofProperty Rights: AStudy ufthe
American West, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (1975).
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B. Voluntary Pooling Agreements and Market Failures
Given the premise that cooperation is beneficial to the
fair and efficient production of oil and gas, the pertinent question
becomes whether voluntary agreements for cooperation are
actually negotiated. A number of barriers may preclude parties
from reaching private voluntary agreements for the development
of oil and gas resources. First, there is a potential for a holdout
problem, where parties realize that their participation is crucial and
seek to extract some demand, such as an inflated royalty, to buy
not only their participation in the cooperative resource production,
but also their acquiescence to removing themselves as obstacles to
agreement. 70 Second, "imperfect and asymmetric information" on
the value of tracts can hinder agreements, especially as parties tend
to overestimate the value of their own property.1 Third, transaction
costs can be exceedingly high, especially where land ownership is
highly fragmented. 7' In sum, the market for establishing leases and
rights for the development of migratory hydrocarbons is far from
perfect. Therefore, even where parties can gain a mutual advantage
by agreeing to cooperatively develop their common resource, they
will sometimes fail to do so.
Some states do not see these potential market failures as
a great enough risk to warrant state intervention into cooperative
agreements for the development of oil and gas. For example,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia rely on parties to reach private
agreements for cooperative oil or gas development. Although
Pennsylvania has a statute that allows the government to mandate
pooling in some situations, that statute only applies to a limited set of
hydrocarbon reservoirs, and does not include the Marcellus Shale."3
oPaula C. Murray & Frank B. Cross, The Casefor a Texas Compulsory Unitization Statute, 23 ST. MARY's L.J. 1099, 1113 (1992); Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D.
Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: ContractualFailurein the Presence oflmperfect
Inforination, 75 THE Am. EcoN. RLv. 368 (1985).
'1Libecap & Smith, Economic Evolution, supra note 56, at 593-94; Wiggins &
Libecap, supra note 70; see also Murray & Cross, supra note 70, at 1115-16.
7Libecap & Smith, Economic Evolution, supranote 56, at 593; Murray & Cross,
supra note 70, at 1113.
58 PA. STAT. ANN. §408 (West 2010).
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The lack of broadly applicable forced pooling statutes reflects a
belief that competition under the rule of capture or cooperation
through voluntary private agreements provide sufficient protection
to landowners' property rights7 4 (perhaps even superior protection
compared to forced pooling) and satisfactorily promotes the efficient
production of oil and natural gas.

IV.

FORCED POOLING

Other states deem cooperative development of oil and gas
resources to be sufficiently important and the potential for market
failures to be sufficiently great to warrant government interference
in that market. These states use forced pooling to compel landowners
to cooperate with their neighbors for development of a common
reservoir.
Forced pooling essentially creates a limited property right
for landowners in the oil or gas on their property. Landowners in
a forced pool are entitled to compensation for the oil or gas that is
removed from their land, which is typically calculated based on a
landowner's proportionate acreage in the pooled area." However,
landowners in a forced pool lack the authority to prohibit others
from extracting the oil or gas from their land in the first place. While
forced pooling does not necessarily abandon the rule of capture, it
significantly alters the application of the rule.6
A. Spacing Unit Formation
The first step toward creating a forced pool is determining
the applicable pool, i.e., the "spacing unit." For traditional oil and
gas resources, which are developed using vertical wells where
74

See, e.g., PA. DEPT OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 39 ("Of course, the law of
capture applies on your side of the property line if you drill awell. So to protect
their investments in wells to be drilled, most operators are willing to enter into
voluntary pooling or unitization agreements for wells to be placed close to neighboring tracts.").

& Anderson, supra note 48, at 952.
W Land Services, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 26 A.D.3d 15,
16-18 (N.Y.App. Div. 2005).
,Kramer
6E.g.,
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hydrocarbons migrate to the well under natural subsurface pressure,
the appropriate size of the spacing unit can be based on the average
migration distance of hydrocarbons to the well. However, due to the
low permeability of shale, shale gas does not naturally migrate to the
wellbore in significant amounts. Defining a spacing unit for shale
gas based on the migration distance of hydrocarbons using primary
recovery would be senseless because no such spacing unit could
be economically developed. Instead, states base shale spacing units
on the area that can be economically developed using one well.
However, even this definition of a drilling unit might have to be
updated for modern shale gas development, where several horizontal
wells can be drilled from a single well pad.
In New York, the formation of a spacing unit begins when
an applicant for a permit to drill a well proposes a spacing unit. If
the proposed spacing unit conforms to state unit size and setback
requirements, New York will issue a drilling permit without a
hearing on the unit./" The size of conforming spacing units is "based
on [the] depth of the objective producing zone and, in some cases,
the specific rock formation targeted for production," 7 9 as well as
the production technique in certain circumstances. Ohio follows
a similar procedure of reviewing proposed spacing units when
deciding whether to issue a well permit." However, in Ohio the well
spacing regulations are dependent only on the depth of the well.8
B. Forced Pooling Orders
If a well operator applies for a forced pooling order for a
spacing unit, the state will review that application to determine
whether the well operator has met the necessary criteria for the state
E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 324.61513(2) (West 2010) (defining a spacing
unit as "the maximum area that may be efficiently and economically drained by
I well").
78
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 23-0503(2) (McKinney 2010).
1Bradley J. Field, DEC Program Policy DW-1: Public Hearing Processesfor
Oil and Gas Well Spacing and Compulsory Integration, N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL.
CONSERV. (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.dec.ny.govienergy/28013.html.
SoCOHJo ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-04(A) (2006).
I1d.at 1501:9-1-04(C).
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to issue the forced pooling order. In New York, "[b]efore compulsory
integration proceeds, the operator must attest to control of oil and
gas rights for at least [sixty percent] of the acreage in a spacing
unit." 82 If the well operator has voluntary control of at least sixty
percent of the acreage in the spacing unit, but less than one hundred
percent of the acreage, New York must conduct a "detailed study and
analysis," including holding a hearing on the potential pooling." If
New York finds "that the integration of interests in spacing units,
under conditions then existing in [the] state, or in the field or pool
to be affected, is necessary" to "prevent waste," generate "greater
ultimate recovery of oil and gas," and protect "the correlative rights
of all owners and the rights of all persons including landowners and
the general public," then New York is required to make an integration
order "upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable." 84
Based on these policy requirements, most proposals for
forced pooling should result in an integration order. The most
problematic requirement for forced pooling may be determining
that a request for a forced pooling order protects "the rights of all
persons including landowners" because landowners may argue that
forced pooling violates their property rights, as described below in
Section V.A. However, by creating a provision for forced pooling,
the New York Legislature has essentially declared that landowners
do not generally have a right to abstain from development of the
mineral resources under their land if the other requirements for
forced pooling are fulfilled. The other policy requirements are more
easily met by forced pooling, which is specifically designed to
address many of those very concerns. Forced pooling prevents waste
through reducing inefficient competition and excessive drilling.
It also generates greater recovery of migratory hydrocarbons by
eliminating holdout problems that would otherwise create barriers
to cooperative drilling. Forced pooling deliberately protects
82

N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Landowner Option Guide, OIL & GAs: WELL
SPACING AND COMPULSORY INTEGRATION, http://xwww.dec.ny.gov/energy/1590.html

(last visited Jan. 16, 2011) [hereinafter NY Landowner Option Guide]; accord
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§ 23-0901(6) (McKinney 2010).
'N.Y.ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 23-0901(2).
84Id. §§ 23-0301, 23-0901(2)-(3).
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correlative rights by compensating landowners for oil or gas that
is likely removed from their property by nearby drilling. Finally,
forced pooling guards "the rights of ... the general public" by
encouraging more efficient and, arguably environmentally friendly,
development of the mineral resources in the state. Given that forced
pooling almost by definition meets the required policy objectives set
forth by New York, few, if any, proposals for forced pooling should
fail to meet the findings required by New York for issuing a forced
pooling order.
In Ohio, a well operator can apply for a forced pooling
order if his "tract of land is of insufficient size or shape to meet
the requirements for drilling a well," there is no obvious alternative
location, and he has been unable to form a voluntary pool." ITo these
statutory requirements, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources
adds that, "the operator must have assembled the majority (>90%
is recommended) of his unit with lessors that want to have a well
drilled." 8 Like New York, Ohio also requires that the opportunity
for a hearing be given to landowners within a unit where a forced
pooling order has been proposed. After these processes, if Ohio
is "satisfied that . . . mandatory pooling is necessary to protect
correlative rights and to provide effective development, use, and
conservation of oil and gas," then it must issue a drilling permit and
a forced pooling order.
The forced pooling provisions in New York and Ohio allow
the state to compel landowners who are not developing their oil or
gas resources to enter a pool with a well operator and neighboring
landowners who do want to develop oil or gas. Alternatively, a state
might want to compel landowners who are developing oil or gas to
include a neighboring landowner who has not drilled on his own land.
OHIo RLV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West 2010); OHIo DEP'T OF NATURAL REs., REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING A MANDAT7ORY POOLINGAPPLICATION (June 10, 20 10), available at http:/xwww.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/11/oil/pdf/mandatory poolingproce-

dural outline.pdf; Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res., Mandatory Pooling Overview, Div.
MiN. RESOURCES MGTN., http:xx/www.dnr.state.oh.us/mineral/mandatory pooling/
tabid/19234/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Ohio Mandatory
Pooling Overview].
6Ohiu AlandaturyPuuling Qverview, supranote 85.
7
OH10 REV. CODE ANN. §1509.27 (West 2010).
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As long as certain criteria are met, Texas's forced pooling statute
allows the state to do just that, even after the producing landowner
has drilled a well." While this paper concentrates on the New York
and Ohio style of forced pooling, it is worthwhile to momentarily
consider why these states have taken different approaches to forced
pooling.
One possible explanation for Texas taking a different
approach from New York and Ohio is a differing degree of land
fragmentation. In New York, there is a high degree of land
fragmentation. For example, one spacing unit subject to forced
pooling in New York consists of 112 complete or partial tracts." If,
as might be suspected, Texas has significantly larger tracts of land
than New York, drilling a well would affect fewer neighbors. With
fewer parties involved, it is more likely that the parties could reach a
voluntary agreement for the efficient development of their common
resource. Therefore, rather than resorting to pooling prior to drilling,
Texas may prefer to rely on private negotiations and only intervene
with a forced pooling order when drilling begins without a voluntary
private agreement and one party is sufficiently aggrieved to turn to
the state for assistance.
Alternatively, the states' differing approaches may be
explained by a cultural or historical commitment to the rule of
capture by Texas. Establishing forced pooling is a radical alteration
to oil and gas property rights - one that Texas might be hesitant
to make. While Texas's forced pooling provision recognizes the
protection of correlative rights as a reason to issue a forced pooling

1 TEX. NAT.

REhS. CODE A-NiN. § 102.011 (West 2009); see also Coastal Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2008) (describing the potential use of this provision by a landowner who cannot sufficiently guard against
drainage of natural gas from his land by a gas well operated on his neighbor's
land).
" In the matter of integration of interests within an individual spacing unit pursuant to Environmental Conservation Law ("ECL") §23-0901(3), Order No. DMN
08-52 (N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Div. of Min. Resources, Dec. 11, 2008)
[hereinafter N.Y. Integration Order]. This integration order was provided to the
author by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation upon the
author's request to see an example forced pooling order from New York.
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order, 90 it requires the person seeking to enforce his correlative rights
to pursue the state's aid rather than protecting correlative rights by
default.
C. Modification of Forced-in Landowners' Right to Exclude
In both New York and Ohio, a forced pooling order does not
give the well operator the right to enter the surface property of a
forced-in landowner without his consent. 9 However, a well operator
may legally pass a horizontal wellbore through the subsurface
property of a forced-in landowner.' New York does not consider
drilling a wellbore through forced-in land to be a trespass after the
order for forced pooling has been finalized. This is because, under
a forced pooling order, each landowner is compensated not only for
the taking of gas from his property, but also for the taking of other
entities, such as the rock removed when the wellbore is drilled. 93
An alternative rationale for allowing a horizontal wellbore through
forced-in subsurface property would be to conceptualize the forced
pooling order as the state's permission for the well operator to
engage in what would otherwise be trespass.94
Whatever the rationale, well operators cannot commence
90 TEX. NAT. REs. CODEANN. § 102.011 (West 2010).
91 OHIo REV. CODE Am. § 1509.27 (West 2010) ("No

surface operations or disturbances to the surface of the land shall occur on a tract pooled by an order without
the written consent of or a written agreement with the owner of the tract that approves the operations or disturbances."); N.Y Landowner Option Guide, supra
note 82 (New York "DEC's integration order will not give the well operator the
right to enter your property"); Telephone Interview with Thomas Noll, N.Y. Dep't
of Envtl. Conservation (Oct. 21, 2010) (explaining that mandatory pooling orders
do not give well operators the right to access the surface of an unleased parcel in
a spacing unit).
92 Telephone Interview with Thomas Noll, supra note 91.
93Id.
9 See, e.g., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962)

("[J]f, in the valid exercise of its authority to prevent waste, protect correlative
rights, or in the exercise of other powers within its jurisdiction, the [Texas Railroad] Commission authorizes secondary recovery projects, a trespass does not
occur xxhen the injected, secondary recovery forces move across lease lines, and
the operations are not subject to an injunction on that basis.").
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drilling through a forced-in landowners' property until the forced
pooling process is concluded. Therefore, well operators often drill
horizontal boreholes that circumvent forced-in property to avoid
waiting for the finalization of the forced pooling order to begin
drilling.5 Yet if well operators can usually drill to avoid forcedin property, why do states apply forced pooling to horizontal
wells? There are a number of possible explanations. First, and
most importantly, the state may want forced-in landowners to
be compensated for hydrocarbons taken from their land and for
fractures that extend into their land regardless ofwhether a horizontal
wellbore enters their land. Second, the state may want to benefit
well operators by allowing them to hydraulicallv fracture the land
of forced-in landowners without worrying about potential trespass
liability. Third, the state may want to further support well operators
by allowing them to locate wellbores wherever they choose within
the pool, even if well operators do not often exercise that right.
D. Financial Benefits and Liabilities for Forced-in Landowners
States give forced-in landowners choices as to how to
balance the benefits, costs, and risks of being forced into a pool. In
New York, for example, a forced-in landowner has three options for
the allocation of costs and benefits associated with his involvement
in the pool: royalty ownership, integrated non-participating
ownership, and integrated participating ownership.96 The default
option for a forced-in owner is integration as a royalty owner. An
integrated royalty owner bears no liability for the costs of drilling
or operating the well, nor any responsibility for damage caused by
the well. In return for the gas removed from his land, an integrated
royalty owner receives a royalty of at least one eighth of the revenue
generated by his proportionate share of surface acreage within the
95 Telephone

Interview with Thomas Noll, supranote 91.

LAw§ 23-0901 (McKiiney 2010); see alsoN.Y Landowner Option Guide, supra note 82 (offering a simplified explanation of the
provisions set forth in § 23-0901. For a point of comparison, see Ohio's available compensation schemes for forced-in landowners at OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
1509.27 (West 2010).
96N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
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spacing unit for the life of the well.9
In contrast to integrated royalty owners, both integrated
non-participating owners and integrated participating owners pay
for well costs, which include costs for activities such as drilling
and operating the well, obtaining insurance and permits, paying
taxes, and conducting environmental mitigation work. Integrated
participating owners pay these costs at the time of the integration
hearing, before any drilling is done. Having borne the well costs,
integrated participating owners are entitled to the total revenue
proportionate to their share of acreage within the spacing unit.98
Rather than paying well costs upfront, integrated nonparticipating owners have the well costs subtracted from revenue
they would otherwise receive from the well. This scheme allows
integrated non-participating owners to avoid the risk of paying for a
well that does not ultimately produce gas. Because the well operator
takes this risk on behalf of the integrated non-participating owner,
the well operator is entitled to collect a risk penalty of two hundred
percent of the well costs from the integrated non-participating

owner.99
An important factor for the success of forced pools is that
plans for drilling and operating wells are made before forced-in
landowners choose their level of involvement. Generally. if owners
within a pool are allocated differing costs and benefits, as is the case
with the multiple options available to forced-in owners, "intense
conflict may result" due to varying positions on whether incremental
investments to increase production are worthwhile. 0 0 For example,
one could imagine that integrated royalty owners in New York, unlike
integrated participating and non-participating owners, would always
advocate additional investments to increase production because
they bear no risk of losing money if those investments fail to result
in actual increases in production. Conflicts between different types
of forced-in owners (and between forced-in and voluntary owners)
d.
98Id.
99 Id
10 Libecap & Smith, Ecunmic Evlutin,supra note 58, at 596-97; Libecap &
97

Smith, SelfEnforcing Provisions, supranote 5.
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are mitigated by requirements that well operators prepare and
submit to the state an estimate of the costs associated with the well
before forced-in owners choose their integration type.0 Therefore,
production plans are largely decided before owners are forced-in and
select their form of integration, which decreases the opportunity for
conflict between landowners over how much to invest in production.
Another important aspect of forced pooling is that forcedin owners choose their integration type before the well is drilled
and before they know how much oil or gas will be produced by
the well. 02 'Therefore, forced-in owners choose their level of
involvement based on their own tolerance of exposure to risk, as do
landowners who reach voluntary agreements for the use of their land.
If forced-in owners were able to choose their involvement after the
well started to produce, they would be given a significant advantage
over voluntary members of the pool who would contract with well

operators in the absence of knowledge on the productivity of the
specific well. In such a scenario, most landowners would be in a
better position if they waited to be forced into the pool, which would
result in a dearth of voluntary landowners for oil and gas production.
Because a significant proportion of acreage in a proposed pool must
be under voluntary agreement before others will be forced in, the
current forced pooling system would crumble.

V. TRADITIONAL

EFFECTS OF FORCED POOLING

The effects of forced pooling should not be considered in
isolation, but rather in comparison to the effects of whatever property
regime would exist without forced pooling. For the discussion
below, it will be presumed that the rule of capture is the dominant
property rule for oil and gas production in the absence of forced
pooling. Given the difficulties of obtaining voluntary agreements
'N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§ 23.0901(3)(c) (McKinney 2010); Ohio Aandatory Pooling Overview, supra note 85.
a E.g., N.Y Landowner Option Guide, supra note 82; see Wiggins & Libecap,
supra note 70 ("We argue that the principal causes of contractual failure are imperfect and asymmetric information that prevent agreement on lease values and
hold-out strategies of firms to increase their share of unit rents.").
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for the development of migratory hydrocarbons, especially when
numerous parties are involved, it also will be assumed that there are
no large-scale private cooperative agreements.
A. Effects on Forced-in Landowners
Much of the opposition to forced pooling stems from a
concern that forced pooling unduly tramples on the property rights
of landowners who have not reached voluntary agreements for
gas development on their land.' As reviewed below, there are at
least four negative impacts to the property rights of a landowner
xxho is forced into a pool. However, even in the absence of forced
pooling, there are limits on a landowner's ability to control the
hydrocarbon resources in his subsurface property. The impacts of
forced pooling on a forced-in landowner's property rights seem
significantly less intrusive when compared with the property rights
of landowners under the rule of capture than when considered in
isolation. Additionally, in return for losses to property rights from
forced pooling, forced-in landowners receive the benefit of financial
compensation for the hydrocarbons taken from their land. Such
compensation would not be required under the rule of capture alone.
First, a forced-in landowner loses leverage to negotiate terms
for the leasing of his land for oil or gas development. Once a well
operator obtains the minimum percent of acreage to move forward

with forced pooling, that well operator may have little incentive to
negotiate a deal that surpasses the state-mandated compensation for
forced-in owners with any landowner in the spacing unit who does
not alreadv have a lease. Therefore, a landowner may be forced to
choose between racing his neighbors to close a deal with the well
operator, having to make a deal no better than the deal he would
receive if forced into the pool, and being forced into the pool.104
103E.g.,

Letter to the Editor, Severance Tax Bill Skimps on Aoney for Local, DAILY

RLVIEw (Towanda, Pa.) (Oct. 10, 2010), http://thedailyreview.com/opinion/sever-

ance-tax-bill-skimps-on-money-for-local- 1.1046252 ("While there may be some
environmental benefits from forced pooling, they do not trump aproperty owner's
right to do what he or she wants with their property.").
104T States, such as Ohio, wxhere the wll operator is required to attempt to reach
voluntary agreements to form a spacing unit before the state wxill issue a forced
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However, even without forced pooling, a landowner may
be coerced into making an unfavorable deal with well operators as
he and his neighbors race to capture gas from one another's land.
Essentially, with or without forced pooling, a landowner must race his
neighbors in order to negotiate favorable terms with a well operating
company. If there is forced pooling, landowners who lose that race
will either be forced into a pool or reach a voluntary agreement
that is likely near the level of state-mandated compensation. In the
absence of forced pooling, landowners who lose the race may lose
gas from their property without receiving any compensation at all.
Moreover, concerns that well operators will terminate
negotiations for voluntary agreements may not be supported by
empirical evidence. For example in one spacing unit subject to
forced pooling in New York, ninety-two percent of the acreage in
the unit was voluntarily leased,)o1 despite the fact that New York
requires only sixty percent of the acreage be voluntarily leased as a
prerequisite for forced pooling." This example provides anecdotal
evidence that well operators will pursue voluntary leases even after
they have procured leases for the minimum acreage necessary for a
forced pooling order.
Second, once forced into a pool, a property owner loses the
choice to abstain from or delay development of oil or gas on his
land. A property owner might want to abstain from development of
oil or natural gas, for example, if he is deeply concerned about the
environmental risks of oil or gas production. He might want to delay
development of his oil or natural gas if he thinks that he will be able
to fetch a higher price for it at a later date or develop it more cheaply
or safely in the future.
Yet even under the rule of capture, a landowner has limited
ability to stop others from capturing and developing the oil and gas
that originate in his subsurface property. If a landowner has a large
pooling order, a landowner might receive more than a state-mandated minimum
even if he reaches an agreement later than most of his neighbors. See OHIo REV.
CODE ANN.§ 1509.27 (West 2010) (including the inability to form a voluntary
pool as a condition for applying for a forced pooling order).
105
See, N.Y. Integration Order, supra note 89.
'oN.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw§ 23-0901(6) (McKinney 2010).
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plot, then activity on neighbors' land may be unable to reach the
oil and gas reserves at the center of his plot. However, the oil and
gas from the edges of a large plot or from the entirety of a small
plot may be developed even if the owner of that land wishes to
abstain from or delay development of those resources. Therefore,
in the absence of forced pooling, the actual limitation of choice to
abstain from or delay development is dependent upon the size of
the landowner's plot relative to the distance from which a well can
capture the hydrocarbon resource.
Third, a forced-in landowner cannot prevent hydraulic
fractures or wellbores from entering his property. Even in the
absence of forced pooling, a property owner might not have the right
to exclude hydraulic fractures from his land. 08 However, forced
pooling at least removes a forced-in landowner's right to exclude
a wellbore from his subsurface property. While the mere existence
of a wellbore thousands of feet underground may cause minimal
harm to a landowner, the forced-in landowner also loses whatever
ability he had to abstain from or delay the development of oil or gas
that is contained in his subsurface property. Although that ability
might have been minimal under the rule of capture, forced pooling
completely eliminates it.
Fourth, a forced-in landowner loses the option to compete
with his neighbors to capture the hydrocarbons underlying the
neighbors' property."0 If the same amount of gas were developed at
the same cost with or without forced pooling, then forced pooling
(under which forced-in landowners are compensated based on their
relative acreage within the pool) would disadvantage a landowner
xxho would "win" under the rule of capture by capturing more oil or
gas from his neighbors' property than they capture from his property.
However, as discussed above, forced pooling leads to more
efficient development of migratory hydrocarbons. Therefore, for
107Telephone Interview with Thomas Noll, supra note 91.
"oSee Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W3d I (Tex. 2008).
' See, e.g., Neal, supra note 57, at 160 (explaining that, with drilling units,
"[e]very owner forfeits the right to drill a well on his or her own individual tract
of land, but every oVxner wxithin the drilling unit will share in production from the

wxell."').
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a landowner to receive greater financial benefit under the rule of
capture than as a forced-in landowner, he would have to capture
enough additional oil or gas from his neighbors' land to more than
off-set that gain in efficiency. In a competitive model, such as under
the rule of capture, it is doubtful that many neighbors would allow
one landowner to gain significantly more from their property than
they gain from his property.
Forced pooling laws leave at least one important property
right of landowners untouched. At least in the states with significant
areas of Marcellus Shale, forced-in owners retain their ability to
exclude well work from their surface property.'o Given that some
states require surface owners to give subsurface owners reasonable
surface access where the surface and subsurface estates are
severed,"1 a state might similarly require forced-in owners to give
well operators reasonable access to their surface property for the
good of the pool as a whole. States probably do not require that
forced-in owners allow access to their surface property because there
is the ready alternative of using the surface property of voluntary
members of the pool.
B. Effects on Landowners Who Voluntarily Lease Their
Property for Oil or Gas Development
Forced pooling presents financial advantages and
disadvantages for members of a forced pool who voluntarily lease
their land for oil or gas development. The primary advantage to
no OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West 2010) ("No surface operations or disturbances to the surface of the land shall occur on a tract pooled by an order without
the written consent of or a written agreement with the owner of the tract that approves the operations or disturbances."); Landowner Option Guide, supranote 82
(New York "DEC's integration order will not give the well operator the right to
enter your property."); Telephone Interview with Thomas Noll, supra note 91; see
also Memorandum from Reps. Marc Gergely & Garth Everett to all Pennsylvania
House Members, Request for Co-Sponsorship - Conservation Pooling (June 15,
2010) (including apolicy goal of "[e]nsuring no surface trespass for non-mineral
interest owners who are pooled into a unit").
PA.
Pn DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 39; O-HO DEPT OF NAT. RESOURCES,
supra note 40.
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voluntary lessees is that the total profit generated by the pooled area
should be greater under a forced pooling regime than under the rule
of capture. Under the rule of capture, uncoordinated competition
can cause inefficient development of resources and voluntary
coordination includes high transaction costs, especially if holdouts
are involved. Forced pooling can avoid these costs.
However, forced pooling may also have negative financial
impacts on voluntary lessees. Because no particular lease is critical
to gas development if landowners can be forced into a pool, voluntary
lessees in forced pools may have to accept less compensation than
if voluntary coordination were used." Furthermore, as discussed
above, a landowner who can take significantly more oil and gas
from his neighbors' property than they take from his property would
profit more under the rule of capture than under the acreage-based
compensation scheme common to forced pooling.
Forced pooling also avoids a thorny situation that could
arise for landowners who wish to lease their land for oil or gas
development in states that adopt well spacing regulations. With a
minimum distance required between wells, a landowner who wants
to develop his resources could be prevented from drilling a well
on his property if a neighbor within the minimum spacing distance
had already drilled a well."" If there is forced pooling, landowners
in the pool who are not allowed to drill an oil or gas well on their
own property are at least financially compensated.114 Without forced
pooling, landowners who are prohibited from drilling on their own
land by spacing regulations are not entitled to compensation.

""E.g., Elizabeth Skrapits, Legislator Opposes 'Pooling'by Gas Companies, Tim
THEMS-TRIBLNE (Scranton, Pa.) (July 23, 2010), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news!
legislator-opposes-pooling-by-gas-companies-1.899429#axzzIqERcWJDR ("By
giving the companies the ability to compel some instead of having to negotiate
with all, [Texas State Senator Lisa Baker says], forced pooling would diminish the
value of leases for every property holder.").
113Murray & Cross, supra note 70, at 1119.
114 See, e.g., Neal, supra note 57, at 160 (explaining that, with drilling units,
"[e]very owner forfeits the right to drill a well on his or her own individual tract
of land, but every oVXner wxithin the dIlling unit wxill share in production from the
xxell."').
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C. Effects on the Environment
Forced pooling has mixed impacts for the environrent.
Importantly, the environmental impacts of natural gas development,
as described in Section I.B, are not exclusively contained within
the boundaries of a pooled area. Forced pooling benefits the
envitronment by preventing excessive drilling. Therefore, there are
fewer well pads, which leads to less forest fragmentation and fewer
sites disturbed at the surface by drilling activity.
Yet forced pooling also allows natural gas development
(which is accompanied by various environnental impacts"') to
occur where it might not otherwise, including in some areas that
have not previously been subject to such an industrial use of the
land. John Sprankling observed that American property law "tends
to resolve use ... disputes concerning [wilderness] land by favoring
the exploiter over the preserver."" 6 In this sense, forced pooling is
aligned with much of American property law. hien the owners of
the minimum required percentage of the acreage in a proposed pool
have reached agreements to develop the oil or gas from their land,
development of those resources will move forward despite potential
opposition from neighbors.
However, forced pooling might not actually have as strong
of an anti-wilderness bias as some other areas of property law. In
his discussion of anti-wilderness, Sprankling largely focuses on the
bias present when two parties are in disagreement, such as a titular
owner and an adverse possessor or a landowner and a trespasser."'
In contrast to these two-party disputes, forced pooling disputes
typically involve numerous parties and states require a supermajority
of the acreage in the proposed pool to have been voluntarily leased
for development. Therefore, one might see forced pooling not as a
triumph of exploiters over preservationists, but rather as a votingbased system with votes allocated per acreage.

"XSee Section I.B, supra.
" 6Jolm G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American PropertyLaw, 63 U.
Cm. L. REv. 519, 556 (1996).
117d.
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D. Effects on the Oil and Natural Gas Industry
Forced pooling has generally positive consequences for the
oil and gas industry. Forced pooling gives gas companies access to
land that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. It also allows
for more efficient production of oil and gas. Not only does more
efficient production allow oil and gas companies to see a larger
profit margin on the wells they drill in the present, it also allows for
the development of more oil and gas resources over the long-run.18

VI. UNIQUE

CHARACTERISTICS OF SHALE GAS AND THEIR

IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCED POOLING

A. Non-migratory Nature of Shale Gas
Shale gas development may not be a proper target for
forced pooling regulations, which have been traditionally applied to
migratory mineral resources. Due to shale's low permeability, shale
gas does not migrate far under natural subsurface pressures." 9 The
relatively non-migratory nature of shale gas has mixed consequences
for the role of forced pooling in the development of shale gas.
On the one hand, the low permeability requires the use
of horizontal drilling to economically extract shale gas. Because
drilling a wellbore underneath a landowner's property without his
consent or a forced pooling order is a form of trespass, and there
may be multiple landowners along a path where a well operator
wants to drill, an operator may have to seek permission to drill
from several landowners in order to develop the resource. Although
there might be several possibilities for where to drill horizontally
within the reservoir, without forced pooling each landowner along
any proposed line would effectively have the ability to prevent a
horizontal well along that line. Forced pooling reduces the number
of permissions required to proceed with developing natural gas to
some percentage of owners, less than one hundred percent, along that
horizontal line. In this sense, forced pooling might be considered a
"8 STEPHEN

L.

McDONALD,

PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

32 (1971).
"9 SHALE GAs PRIMER, supra note 13, at 13-14.

EcoNUMIcUANALYSSI
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solution to a spatial anti-commons problem, i.e., "a property regime
in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a
scarce resource." 1 0 Viewed in light of the use of horizontal drilling
over significant distances, the non-migratory nature of shale gas
increases the importance of forced pooling.
On the other hand, the low permeability of shale also leads
well operators to use hydrofracturing. Well operators claim to have
significant control over hydraulic fractures, as well as the location
of the wellbore. Ifxwell operators have significant control over where
hydraulic fractures occur and how far they extend laterally. then it is
not obvious that by drilling a well the well operator will inevitably
capture gas from neighbors' property. Perhaps well operators could
economically develop shale gas while avoiding interfering with
unleased land. In this case, they could selectively leave the shale
gas undisturbed in some tracts of land that are relatively close to
the wellbore. Of course, a small landowner opting not to have
gas developed from his land in conjunction with his neighbors
may be left with a reserve of natural gas that is not economically
worthwhile to develop. Yet that could be the landowner's decision
to make, especially if a well operator can avoid taking gas from
the landowner's land while economically developing other gas.
Because the non-migratory nature of shale gas gives well operators
greater control over where they extract gas from, the need for forced
pooling is minimized.
B. Opposition to Shale Gas Development
As discussed above, scholars traditionally understand the
typical barriers to voluntary cooperation between neighbors to be
economic barriers, such as holdout problems,m high transaction
costs, and "incomplete and asymmetric information" for use as the
basis for negotiations. Underlying this traditional analysis is an
120Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy ofthe Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Aarkets, 111 HIiARv. L. REv. 621, 668 (1998).
121E g., CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, supra note 46.
122Murray & Cross, supra note 70, at 1113.
23
1 Libecap & Smith, Economic Evolution, supra note 58, at 593-94.
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assumption that all landowners want to develop the hydrocarbon
resources underlying their land and refuse offered agreements based
only on the financial terms of the offer and the presumption that
a better deal will be offered in the future. However, for shale gas
development, these economic considerations are accompanied by
environmental concerns. Therefore, if a state decides that it wants
to apply forced pooling to shale gas reserves, it must decide whether
to modify its traditional forced pooling rules in light of these unique
concerns. There are several ways that a state might modify its
forced pooling rules to respond to environmental opposition to gas
development.
1. Compensation Requirements for Forced Pooling
Policymakers who face opposition to forced pooling
may attempt to appease upset forced-in landowners by altering
the requirements for compensation due to forced-in landowners.
Compensation requirements could be modified in two ways. First, a
state might offer additional acreage-based compensation to forcedin landowners in certain pools or where certain techniques are
used. Such an increase could be viewed as an attempt to partially
compensate for the landowners' average demoralization costs of
being forced into the pool.125 However, a landowner might still
oppose gas development even with unusually generous compensation
if his opposition is motivated by a judgment that it is fundamentally
xxTong to develop shale gas given the environmental risks. Given
the possibility that landowners who oppose shale gas development
will not be appeased by increased compensation, mandating such
payments from well operators may not be worthwhile, especially
given the foreseeable opposition by well operators and gas
companies.

124 E.g.,

Memorandum from the Congressional Research Service, supra note 28,

at 2.

Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
EthicalFuundatiuns uf "Just Cumpensatiun" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214
125 See

(1967) (defining demoralization costs).
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Second, compensation could be paid not only for gas
taken from the land, but also for the increased environmental risk.
Environmental risks such as pollution of a landowner's water well,
impairment of visual assets, or exposure to local air pollution
from the wellhead do not necessarily correlate to the size of a
landowner's tract of land. Therefore, the same compensation for
environmental risks might be paid to owners of varyingly sized
plots of land, unlike compensation for gas taken from forced-in
landowners, which is paid relative to landowners' proportionate
acreage in a spacing unit. The total compensation due to forcedin landowners would not necessarily increase to compensate for
environmental risk; rather, the same level of compensation could
be allocated differently. Therefore, well operators may not oppose
the change. To implement compensation for environnental risks,
details such as whether residential, commercial, and agricultural
tracts should all receive the same level of compensation would
need to be worked out. Additionally, to better understand the actual
environmental risks presented, states would need to study the effects
of natural gas drilling, especially the impact of hydrofracturing, on
the environment.
However, folding compensation for environmental risk
into pooling seems both awkward and counterproductive. The
environmental risks of natural gas development affect a broader
community than the pooled landowners. For example, although New
York City does not own much of the land in its watershed, the New
York City Department of Environmental Protection believes that
"hydraulic fracturing poses an unacceptable threat to the unfiltered
water supply of nine million New Yorkers and cannot safely be
permitted with[in] the New York City watershed."6 Rather than
increasing compensation for environmental risk within the pool, it
seems more straightforward to compensate forced-in landowners
for gas taken from their property and to use other regulations to
minimize environmental risk and establish liability for pollution

caused by gas production.12 7
Dept of Envtl. Protection, DEP's Position on Natural Gas Drilling,
GAs DRILLING, http://xwww.ny c.gov/html,/dep/html/news/natural-gasdrillingdep.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
27
1 Eg., 58 PA. STr. ANN. §601.208 (West 2010).
126NY.C.

NXT.
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In sum, amending compensation requirements for forced
pooling does not appear to be an effective strategy for addressing
environmental opposition to forced pooling and natural gas
development more generally.
2. Forced Pooling Procedures
Rather than increasing financial compensation to
counterbalance demoralization costs and environmental risks,
states might reformulate their systems for developing the spacing
units that will be subject to forced pooling. A state government that
has forced pooling might argue that it already takes into account
concerns for landowners' rights before issuing a forced integration
order. For example, to issue a forced pooling order. New York
requires a finding by the state that forced integration will protect
"the rights of all persons[,] including landowners and the general
public."1 28 However, if the state does not consider refusal to develop
hydrocarbon resources to be a right of landowners so long as the other
requirements for forced pooling are met, then this consideration is
of little solace to landowners who do not want their land included in
shale gas development.
The procedures for developing spacing units and subjecting
them to forced pooling could be modified in a number of ways.
First, the government itself could identify areas to be subject to
forced pooling, rather than leaving the responsibility to propose
spacing units to well operators, who will likely favor drilling wells
whenever there is an economic benefit to doing so. Well operators
are presumably the default party to propose spacing units because
they have the expertise necessary to identify geologically productive
and economically efficient locations to drill a well. However, if their
contracts are structured so that they are paid for services rather than
based on the productivity of the well (e.g., as in the arrangement
for integrated participating owners in New York), well operators
might have little incentive, beyond establishing a good reputation,
to choose the most productive and efficient places to drill a well.
Furthermore, where well operators do not need to reach voluntary
28
1

N.Y ENVIL. CQNSERV. LAwX§ 23-0901(2)-(3), 23-0301 (McKinney 2010).
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agreements with each landowner in a pool, they may lack sufficient
incentive to consider the social implications of where they establish
spacing units.
Instead, the government could develop proposals for spacing
units based on economics, geology, and the broader environmental
and social implications of developing the resource. In doing so,
states could consider the interests of parties outside a pooled area
that would be affected by production within a pool, such as New
York Citys interest in maintaining a clean unfiltered water supply.
The government could then auction off the proposed spacing units
to well operators for development, perhaps opening the auction at
a price reached through a democratic process among the pooled
landowners. Even if the government develops spacing units for
forced pooling, well operators might still be allowed to form
spacing units and obtain drilling permits fur spacing units where
they are able to obtain voluntary agreements to develop the entirety
of the spacing unit's acreage. HWhile giving the state, rather than well
operators, the responsibility for proposing spacing units would still
result in some landowners being included in pools against their will,
at least the government could be expected to give more weight to the
concerns and rights of forced-in landowners. A significant barrier to
enacting this proposal would be the high administrative costs that it
would place on the state.
Second, where the government identifies especially strong
opposition to the development of a resource, the state might
increase the percentage of acreage voluntarily leased for oil or gas
development that is required for approval of a forced pooling order.
For example, New York might require well operators to obtain
voluntary agreements to develop ninety percent, rather than sixty
percent, of the acreage in a proposed spacing unit to be subjected
to forced pooling for development of shale gas from the Marcellus
Shale. Alternatively, the percent acreage requirement might be based
on a production technique (e.g., hydrofracturing) to be used for the
proposed well. While this plan would still allow some landowners to
be forced into a pool against their will, at least their desire to exclude
gas development from their property would be subjugated to the
opposing wishes of a larger proportion of their neighbors (based

218 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

on acreage). Furthermore, fewer landowners would be subjected
to forced pooling over their opposition because there would be an
additional hurdle for well operators to overcome in disregarding
those desires. While this scheme would not directly account for the
concerns of parties outside the pooled area, those concerns could be
explicitly weighed by the state at a hearing on whether to order the
forced pooling and might be addressed through mechanisms other
than forced pooling. Because this alteration to the forced pooling
process would have considerably lower administrative costs for the
government than the previous suggestion, it is the better provision
for a state to enact in response to significant opposition to shale gas
development.
CONCLUSION
Forced pooling can provide significant benefits, at
relatively minor costs, for the development of traditional oil or
gas resources from a common reservoir. While forced pooling is
generally advantageous to landowners and communities, the details
of how pools are developed need revision to better manage the
social, environmental, and technical characteristics of shale gas
development, including staunch opposition to development by
some landowners. States should analyze whether the economic
development of shale gas requires that well operators be allowed
to access land that has not been voluntarily leased for shale gas
development. If such access is not necessary, states should seriously
consider not using forced pooling for shale gas development. Where
states do provide forced pooling for shale gas development, they
should consider increasing the minimum percent of acreage in a
spacing unit that must be voluntarily leased in order for a forced
pooling order to be issued.

